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TRANSNATIONAL LAW-MAKING: ASSESSING
THE IMPACT OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION





International commercial dispute resolution through arbitral ad-
judication has grown at an accelerated pace in recent years.' Legis-
lative and decisional law pronouncements in major Western coun-
tries recognize the systemic integrity of the arbitral process and
affirm its utility as an instrument of transnational commerce. This
is especially true in France2 and in the United States,3 despite yes-
*Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Director of the Eason-Weinmann Center for
Comparative Law, Tulane University. DiplSme Supbrieur d'tudes Franaises, Universit6
de Poitiers, 1971; A.B. 1972, Bowdoin College; B.A. 1975, M.A. 1979, Oxford University; J.D.
1978, M.A. 1979, University of Virginia; LL.M. 1979, J.S.D. 1984, Columbia University.
**B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1981; J.D., Tulane University, 1985; Associate,
Arnold & Porter (Washington, D.C.).
' An exhaustive bibliographic survey of the domestic and foreign literature on interna-
tional commercial arbitration would exceed reasonable space limitation. The following list of
works constitutes a representative sample of sources. The classical treatments of the subject
include: R DAVID, L'ARBIrrRAGE DANS LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (1982); P. FOUCHARD,
L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1965); J. ROBERT, LARBITRAGE DROIT INTERNE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVP (5th ed. 1983); C. SCHmrrTHOFF, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARITRATION (multi-volume series); G. WiLNF DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1984);
de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National
Courts, 57 TuL. L. Rsv. 42 (1982); Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
846 (1961).
See also INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION: A ROAD TO WORLD-WIDE COOPERATION (M.
Domke ed. 1958); J. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
(1979); Aksen, International Arbitration - Its Time Has Arrived!, 14 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
L. 247 (1982); Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1191 (1977); Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. L. 164;
McClelland, International Arbitration: A Practical Guide to the System for the Litigation
of Transnational Commercial Disputes, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 729 (1977).
2 See Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of Its Remedial
and Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 33 at 50-57, 77-82
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Arbitral Adjudication]. See also Decree of May 14, 1980, 1980
J.O. 1238, 1980 D.S.L. 207; Decree of May 12, 1981, 1981 J.O. 1398. For commentary on the
French decrees, see Audit, A National Codification of International Commercial Arbitra-
tion: The French Decree of May 12, 1981, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DIsPuTEs THROUGH
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tiges of reluctance in England.4 Moreover, a variety of interna-
tional organizations has emerged,5 promoting and facilitating the
recourse to arbitration in the multifarious circumstances of inter-
national contracts. The 1958 New York Arbitration Convention"
appears to embody not only a wide-ranging, but also a deeply-
rooted transnational consensus on international arbitral dispute
resolution.
The expression of misgivings about the arbitral process has been
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION [Sixth Sokol Colloquium] (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984); Craig,
Park & Paulsson, French Codification of a Legal Framework for International Commercial
Arbitration: The Decree of May 12, 1981, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 727 (1981); Delaume,
International Arbitration Under French Law: The Decree of May 12, 1981, 37 ARB J. 38
(1982); Derains, France, [1982] Y.B. COM. ARB. 3; Goldman, La nouvelle r~glementation
franqaise de l'arbitrage international, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 153 (J. Schultsz & A.
Van Den Berg eds. 1982).
' See Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 2, at 45-53, 65-76; 1970 Arbitra-
tion Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976). Comment, United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards
Convention: United States Accession, 2 CAL. W.L. INT'L L.J. 67 (1971); Quigley, Accession
by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961). See also Czyzak & Sullivan,
American Arbitration Law and the UN Convention, 13 ARB. J. 197 (1958).
4 See Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 2, at 40-45, 62-65. See also
(Eng.) Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42, reprinted in 5 Y. B. COM. ARB. 239-46 (P. Sanders ed.
1980). For commentary on the 1979 Act, see, e.g., Hacking, The "Stated Case" Abolished:
The United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 1979, 14 INT'L LAW. 95 (1980); Park, Judicial Su-
pervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1979,
21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 87 (1980); Steyn, England, 8 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 8 (1983).
' See Delaume, Le Centre international pour le reglement des diff rends relatifs aux
investissements (CIRDI), 109 J. DR. INT'L 775 (1982). See also HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL
ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (E. Cohen, M. Domke, F. Eisemann eds. 1977); Coul-
son, The Future Growth of Institutional Administration in International Commercial Ar-
bitration, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 73 (J. Schultsz & A. Van Den Berg eds. 1982).
8 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened
for signature, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, codified in 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1982). For a comprehensive scholarly discussion of the Convention, see A.
VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981). See also Contini,
International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. J. CoMP. L. 283 (1959); Mirabito, The
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards: The First Four Years, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 471 (1975); Springer, The United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3
INT'L LAW. 320 (1969). See also Sanders, Consolidated Commentary on Court Decisions on
the New York Convention 1958, 4 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 341 (1979). See generally Aksen, Applica-
tion of the New York Convention by United States Courts, [1979] Y.B. CoM. ARB. 341; G.
GAJA, NEW YORK CONVENTION (multi-volume series).
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episodic7 and has not disturbed the basic consensus on its remedial
effectiveness. It is true that practical drawbacks exist.8 Addition-
ally, the transnational character of the arbitral process does raise
legitimate concern about the continued vitality of national inter-
ests within the framework of the arbitral process.9 Nevertheless,
many of the theoretical objections appear moot,10 and the real defi-
7 See, e.g., Rhodes & Sloan, The Pitfalls of International Commercial Arbitration, 17
VAND. J. TRANS. L. 19 (1984).
8 See id.
' See, e.g., Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway To Quixotic Internationalism: As-
sessing the Folly of Mitsubishi, 19 VAND. J. TRAs. L. - (1986).
10 Municipal law can influence the arbitral process in a number of ways. First, the pro-
cedural rules of the forum may determine the manner in which the adjudication will be
conducted. Second, substantive municipal law may govern the resolution of the dispute.
Third, the validity of the award under various national laws may be relevant to the award's
enforceability. Unless the losing party acquiesces to the award, the prevailing party will
lodge an enforcement action before a national court. Finally, questions arise concerning the
relationship between the arbitral tribunal and the laws of the arbitral forum: whether and to
what extent forum law can or should influence the course of arbitration solely because the
tribunal is presiding in the forum.
The English view of the degree to which national laws and policy can or should influence
the international arbitral process is marked by a strong disdain for arbitral anationalism.
English judges and commentators refer disparagingly to a system of "floating" arbitration or
arbitration "unbound." The traditional English view is that a system of procedural or sub-
stantive law for the resolution of disputes can exist only by virtue of sovereign authority. All
adjudications conducted in England must be subject to a certain extent to the English judi-
cial system and procedural rules. For a description of this attitude, see Park, Judicial Su-
pervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1979,
21 HARv. INT'L L. J. 87 (1980). Although weakened somewhat by recent legislation (see Arb.
Act, 1979, c. 42), the restrictive English view of arbitration persists. Accord, Dallal v. Bank
Mellat, [1986] 2 WLR 745.
F.A. Mann is a particularly virulent critic of the concept of international arbitration; he
advocates the restrictive English view of arbitration, whether domestic or international. See,
e.g., Mann, England Rejects "Delocalized" Contracts and Arbitration, 33 INT'L & Comp.
L.Q. 193 (1984); Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in INTERNATioNAL ARErTRATION: LInER
ACORUM FOR MARTIN DOmKE 157 (P. Sanders ed., 1967). [Hereinafter cited as Lex Facit
Arbitrum]. It is Mann's view that "[i]n the legal sense no international commercial arbitra-
tion exists. Just as, notwithstanding its notoriously misleading name, every system of pri-
vate international law is a system of national law, every arbitration is a national arbitration,
that is to say, subject to a specific system of national law." Lex Facit Arbitrum, id. at 159.
Mann's refusal to recognize international commercial arbitration as a form of adjudication
independent of municipal law and national sovereigns reflects a strict Austinian view of the
law. Essentially, Mann argues that there can be no party autonomy, hence no institutional
autonomy, if autonomy is defined as independence from the strictures of national law.
No one has ever or anywhere been able to point to any provision or legal principle
which would permit individuals to act outside the confines of a system of munici-
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ciencies and potential excesses can always be accommodated
through informed dialogue and practical adjustments that do not
compromise the systemic integrity of the arbitral framework. The
fact is that commercial transactions have for centuries been con-
ducted in a transnational context, and merchants have a long his-
tory of autonomy in resolving their own disputes. Any concern over
the viability of a transnational, commercially self-regulating dis-
pute resolution mechanism belies the history of European law
merchant.
Questions concerning the future orientation of the process are
more pressing and demand a definition of the international mission
pal law. Even the idea of the autonomy of the parties exists only by virtue of a
given system of municipal law and in different systems may have different charac-
teristics and effects. Similarly, every arbitration is necessarily subject to the law of
a given state. No private person has the right or power to act on any level other
than that of municipal law, every right or power a private person enjoys is inexo-
rably conferred by or derived from a system of municipal law.
Lex Facit Arbitrum, id. at 160.
Further, Mann rejects the view that arbitrators can decide disputes on the basis of usages
and fairness rather than municipal law: "It is difficult to imagine a more dangerous, more
undesirable and more ill-founded view which denies any measure of predictability and cer-
tainty and confers upon parties to an international commercial contract of their arbitrators
powers that no system of law permits and no court could exercise." Mann, supra at 197.
This attack upon the existing process is objectionable in a number of respects. On the one
hand, the refusal to recognize the evident realities of international commercial activity and
the necessity of having a dispute resolution process that transcends parochial national con-
cerns reveal the sterility of the analysis. It begrudges the creative contributions of the dy-
namic interplay between the law and economic forces merely because they undo prior reali-
ties. On the other hand, the strident character of the analysis clouds the real problem: how
to strike a workable balance between the transnational arbitral process and the integrity of
vital national policy interests - a problem that emerged clearly in the United States Su-
preme Court's recent opinion in Mitsubishi. See text accompanying supra note 9.
The American and French concepts of international commercial arbitration may well be
excessive in some respects. A moderation of these views, however, will not be achieved by a
vociferous denial of what is unmistakably established and functional.
For further discussion of these issues, see J.P. FOUCHARD, supra note 1, at 330-550; Lalive,
Les r~gles de conflit de lois appliqu~es au fond du litige par l'arbitre international sigge-
ant en Suisse, 1976, REv. ARB. 155; Mann, Lexit Facit Arbitrum, in INTERNATIONAL ABrrIR-
TION: LIaER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157 (P. Sanders ed. 1967); Park, The Lex Loci
Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration, 32 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 21 (1983); Park &
Paulsson, The Binding Force of International Arbitral Awards, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 253
(1983); Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound, 30 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 358 (1981); Paulsson, Delo-
calization of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters, 32 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 53 (1983).
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and role of arbitral adjudication. Nations share the perception that
national economies are no longer autonomous, that they must
function within a larger global framework. The question then be-
comes not whether a uniform international law of sales is needed,
but rather how it is to be achieved. The transnational preeminence
that arbitration has gained as a remedial mechanism makes it a
likely vehicle for elaborating a common law of international
contracts.
Arguments proposing the integration of a normative component
to transnational arbitration11 have been complicated by the recent
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (Vienna Convention).12 The Convention aims to establish
a uniform international law of sales through statutory means,13 at-
tempting thereby to minimize the lack of predictability in interna-
tional commercial dealings and possibly fulfilling the function of
supplying a substantive international law of contracts. The exis-
tence of the Convention might render modification of the present
arbitral process unnecessary. The choice is, then, between the crea-
tion of fixed legislative rules in an international instrument (prin-
cipally a civilian approach) or having international arbitral tribu-
nals elaborate the tenets of such a law over time on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis (essentially a common law process).
11 See Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral Awards With Reasons: The Elaboration of a
Common Law of International Transactions, 23 COLUM J. TRANS. L. 579 (1985). "The criti-
cal question regarding the future development of international arbitration adjudication...
is whether it can produce substantive legal principles and, in effect, stimulate and foster the
development of a common law of international transactions." Id. at 581.
12 See Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Vienna
Convention].
13 Proposed United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Hearings on Treaty Doc. 98-9 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] (Statement of Peter H.
Pfund, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International Law, State Dept.). ("[T]he Con-
vention is generally consistent with the approach and outlook of the UCC.") Id. at 5-6. See
generally Lansing and Hauserman, A Comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code to UN-
CITRAL'S Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 6 N.C. J. INrr'L &
CoM. REG. 63 (1980-1981); Dore and DeFranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Pro-
visions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 23 HARv. INT'L L. J. 49 (1982).
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Proponents of the legislative approach could be critical of the
arbitral solution. For example, history, they might argue, reveals
that common law cannot develop without a unified judicial system.
Moreover, they might allege that international arbitrators lack
public jurisdictional authority and are not otherwise qualified to
evaluate and balance various national legal positions on commer-
cial law issues. If international commercial law standards are to be
defined, the argument continues, they should emerge from the text
of an international instrument rather than the makeshift operation
of a private, ad hoc adjudicatory process. International commercial
arbitrators should implement and be guided by legislatively-estab-
lished substantive rules; they should not expect to create legal
principles and doctrines in their haphazard, private adjudicatory
rulings.
The substance of these arguments misunderstands not only the
essential character of the law merchant and the common law, but
also the workings of the transnational legal process. It fails to ac-
count for the role that international arbitral tribunals have already
played and can continue to play in the elaboration of a transna-
tional commercial law. The Supreme Court of Italy recently de-
scribed how the process of commercial arbitration generates non-
national legal rules:
[T]he law in which such arbitration operates is transnational,
being independent of the laws of the individual states. Since
"mercantile" law comes into existence through the adhesion
of merchants to the values of their milieu, merchants comply
with those values, which the majority of them considers bind-
ing, because of necessity. ...
To the extent that it is established that merchants . ..
-independently of their belonging to a state-agree upon the
basic values inherent to their trade, ... a lex mercatoria ex-
ists ....
Accordingly "mercantile" law comes into existence when
binding values are recognized and complied with, and




This article assesses the impact of the Vienna Convention upon
prospective and actual transnational arbitral law-making, and con-
cludes that, given the realities of international commerce, having
arbitral awards rendered by way of published decisions with rea-
sons remains the more viable source of an emerging common law of
international contracts. At best, in light of its substantive deficien-
cies and its political underpinnings, the Convention can only serve
a veiled function, acting as a remote backdrop for arbitral rulings
that actually create viable rules of conduct for international
merchants.
I. THE EXAMPLE OF THE LAW MERCHANT: A BRIEF HISTORICAL
ACCOUNT
Prior to the emergence of modern nation-states, trading transac-
tions were conducted within a largely self-regulatory, customary
framework free of any significant national government constraints.
These self-imposed rules of commercial conduct and dispute reso-
lution, which became known as the law merchant or lex mer-
catoria,5 applied in nearly all regions of Europe. When geographi-
cal territories became autonomous political entities and formed
national legal systems, the customary commercial law was ab-
sorbed into national law. Variations in substance eventually arose,
necessitating a system of choice of law principles to designate a
governing national law for resolving transnational commercial
disputes.
14 Corte Casse, 1982 Foro It. 1 2285 (1982).
1 See generally, W. BEwEs, TIE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT (1923); G. MALYNES,
LEx MERCATORIA (1685); L. TRAmAN, THE LAw MERCHAN1'. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL
LAW (1983); Burdick, What is a Law Merchant?, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERxCAN
LEGAL HISTORY 39 (1909); SCRUTrON, GENERAL SURVEY OF THE HISTORY OF THE LAW
MERCHANT, in id. at 7; Berman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex
Mercatoria), in A LAWYER'S GUmE TO INTERNATIONAL BusnwEsS TRANSACTIONS, Part III, Folio
3 (W. Surrey and D. Wallace, Jr. 2d ed. 1983), a revision of Berman and Kaufman, The Law
of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 IHRv. INT'L L. REv. 221
(1978); Note, A Modern Lex Mercatoria: Political Rhetoric or Substantive Progress?, 3
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 210 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Modern Lex Mercatoria]. See also G.
RONGA, APPROXIMACION A LA HISTORIA DEL DanmcHo MERCHANTIL (1981).
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A. Medieval Trade Fairs
During the Middle Ages, most European trade was conducted at
large commercial fairs, held at established places and times each
year.16 These fairs attracted merchants from all over Europe to
places such as Winchester and Sturbridge in England, Besancon
and Lyons in France, and Novgorod in Russia. 17 Aside from assur-
ances of safe conduct and true coin provided by sovereigns, the
trade fairs were private operations.18
Although the fairs were relatively peaceful, each fair had its own
courts with jurisdiction to resolve the commercial disputes that
might arise.19 These fair courts were designed to respond swiftly to
the dispute resolution needs of merchants.2" As Lord Coke noted,
" See generally, P. HUVELIN, EssAI HISTORIQUE SUR LE DROIT DES MARCH9S ET DES
FoiREs (1897); W. MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT 25-26
(1904); Modern Lex Mercatoria, supra note 15, at 212-15.
17 W BEWES supra note 15, at 94-96; Modern Lex Mercatoria, supra note 15, at 214.
'" The local sovereign's provision of safe conduct for the merchants was indispensable
to the success of medieval trade fairs:
Without the assurance of safe conduct and safe-residence no merchants could
have found it worth their while to travel, while in the absence of these institutions
it is difficult to guess how the requirements of increasing needs and luxuries could
have been supplied. To travel alone and unprotected was to invite attack and
plunder.
W. BEWES, supra note 15, at 106. Moreover, in England, the King's Exchange supervised
international transactions to "regulate the currency, to secure the country against the loss of
specie, and ... to prevent the implication of spurious or debased coin." W. BEWES, supra
note 15, at 195; See also 26 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, (1924) at 536.
19 Id. at 87; Modern Lex Mercatoria, supra note 15, at 213. The two primary medieval
commercial courts were the court of pie powder and the staple court. See 26 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 18, at 535-44. Courts of pie powder were incident to most commercial
fairs. Their name derives from piepoudres or pede pulverosi--"dusty feet," but the signifi-
cance of the name is unclear. One suggested origin for the name is that at fair courts "jus-
tice was administered as speedily as the dust could fall or be removed from the feet of the
litigants." Id. at 536. Another suggestion is that fair courts were "frequented by chapmen
with dusty feet, who wandered from mart to mart." Id. Staple courts were almost identical
to courts of pie powder and were "instituted in the towns of the staple, which, by statute,
were the only authorized ports of entry and export for certain commodities such as wool,
woolfels, leather, tin and lead." Jones, An Inquiry Into The History of the Adjudication of
Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 445, 448
(1958). The staple courts thus regulated trade and customs with regard to these commodi-
ties. Id. Like fair courts, staple courts were run by merchants. Id. at 449.
20 26 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 536. Similarly, Malynes noted: "Merchants'
causes . . . ought to be done with great expedition; . . .Merchants' affairs in controversie
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these courts provided an inexpensive and rapid dispute resolution
mechanism:
[The fair court] is incident to every fair and market because
for contracts and injuries done concerning the fair and mar-
ket there shall be a speedy justice done for advancement of
trade and traffic as the dust can fall from the feet.2
Efficient and simple adjudicatory techniques allowed cases to be
heard from morning until nightfall.22 Although fair courts had ju-
ries, the latter were comprised entirely of merchants who were able
to understand the cases and render timely verdicts not subject to
appeal. 23 Fair courts delivered written, albeit brief, opinions with
reasons. 24 These decisions eventually grew to represent a recogniz-
able corpus of law.
In the late seventeenth century, Gerard Malynes, an English
merchant, wrote the first thorough treatise on the law merchant,
describing, inter alia, its growth during the Middle Ages and early
Renaissance, thereby introducing English merchants and lawyers
to European commercial law.25 Malynes' recognition of the non-na-
tional status of the law merchant is significant, illustrating that the
interest of the commercial community in a uniform law should not
be defeated by national political rivalries or local pride. According
to Malynes, the Law Merchant "is a customary law approved by
the authority of all kingdoms and commonwealths, and not a law
established by the sovereignty of any prince. Further, the exis-
tence of a uniform lex mercatoria, indispensable to the expeditious
and equitable resolution of disputes between merchants, led the
ought with all brevity to be determined, to avoid interruption of trafiick." G. MALYNvs,
supra note 15, at 337.
21 Id.; Scrutton, supra note 15, at 9.
2 G. MALYNEs, supra note 15, at 337; W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 536-37.
23 Malynes, supra note 15, at 337; Scrutton, supra note 15, at 9.
4 See Scrutton, supra note 15, at 10-11 (discussing cases decided between 1275 and
1291).
25 See G. MALtNEs, supra note 15. This work is divided into three parts. The first con-
sists of forty-seven chapters and deals mainly with commercial and maritime law. The sec-
ond deals with money. The third and final section discusses commercial paper, subpoenas,
enforcement of judgments, and the nature of the courts in which the law merchant was
applied.
26 Id. at a.
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various fairs and markets to develop compatible laws."
Good faith and adjudicatory dispatch were two preeminent prin-
ciples of the law merchant.28 The importance of these concepts is
evident in a number of supportive ancillary doctrines. For exam-
ple, an oral contract or a non-notarized document was enforceable
because "among merchants good faith was paramount, and was not
improved by notarial attestation. '29 Similarly, a partnership could
be created by oral agreement.30 Parol evidence could also be used
27 For the maintenance of Traffik and Commerce is so pleasant, amiable, and ac-
ceptable unto all Princes and potentates, that Kings have been and at this day are
of the Society of Merchants: and many times, notwithstanding the particular dif-
ferences and quarrels, they do nevertheless agree in this course of Trade, because
Riches is the bright Star, whose height Traffik takes to direct itself by, or by
Kingdoms and Commonwealths do flourish; merchants being the means and in-
struments to perform the same, to the glory illustration, and benefit of their
monarchys and states.
Id. at 2.
Malynes' description of commercial law as transcending political differences is strikingly
similar to an optative passage which Clive Schmitthoff wrote in 1969:
The evolution of an autonomous law of international trade founded on universally
accepted standards of business conduct, would be one of the most important de-
velopments of legal science in our time. It would constitute a common platform
for commercial lawyers from all countries, those of planned and free market econ-
omy, those of civil law and common law, and those of fully developed and devel-
oping economy, which would enable them to co-operate in the perfection of the
legal mechanism of international trade.
The Law of International Trade, Its Growth, Formulation and Operation, in THE SOURCES
OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (C. Schmitthoff, ed. 1964). See also United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Preamble ("[T]he adoption
of uniform rules ... would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade
and promote the development of international trade.")
I8 See W. BEWES, supra note 15, at 19-25.
Is Id. at 19. By contrast, domestic legal systems have traditionally prescribed certain
formalities as a prerequisite to the enforcement of a contract. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201
(1977); Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, ch. 13 (1677); See generally Cigoj, International Sales:
Formation of Contracts, 23 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 257, 269 (1976). The recent trend in interna-
tional sales law is away from formalities. J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
SALES FOR THE 1980 UNITED NATiONS CONWNTmN 152 (1982); K. ZWEIGERT & H. KoTz, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 50 (1977). The 1980 Sales Convention provides, for ex-
ample: "A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not
subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including
witnesses." Vienna Convention, supra note 12, at art. 11.
SO W. BEwEs, supra note 15, at 21. Again, national legal systems generally impose cer-
tain formalities as prerequisites to the creation of a partnership.
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to contradict a written document.3' Moreover, property in a thing
sold was deemed to pass to the purchaser without delivery.32 An
unpaid vendor had a lien on the goods in the buyer's hands.33 Fi-
nally, the law merchant allowed the admission into evidence of
journals and ledgers to prove a claim upon proper proof of
regularity.
3 4
B. National Incorporation of the Law Merchant
The law merchant flourished as a set of non-national legal rules
for commercial adjudication not only because fair courts were able
to develop and preserve it, but also because the national legal sys-
tems then existing in Europe were content to have mercantile dis-
putes resolved by a process of commercial self-regulation. Over the
course of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries,
however, national legal systems gradually began to encroach upon
that formerly privileged turf and absorb the customary commercial
law.3 5 In England, for example, an increased number of courts and
wider judicial jurisdiction encouraged and facilitated the process of
absorption. As the common law courts heard commercial cases,
they began to take notice of customary commercial law. 6
The incorporation of the law merchant into the common law un-
dermined its non-national status to a considerable extent. More-
over, during this period, the common law courts allowed lay juries
to determine most commercial matters, thereby instilling uncer-
31 Id. at 20. Cf. Goss v. Lord Nugent, [1883] 5 B. & Ad. 58, 110 Eng. Rep. 713, cited in
ZWEIGERT, supra note 29, at 79 ("verbal evidence is not allowed to be given of what passed
between the parties"); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 273 Comment b (1981). But see
Code de Commerce Frangais art. 109 ("With respect to merchants, acts of commerce may be
proven by all means unless it is otherwise provided by law"); J. HONNOLD, supra note 29, at
142 (1980 Sales Convention's requirement that "'due consideration is to be given to all
relevant circumstances of the case' seems adequate" authority to allow use of parol
evidence).
32 W. BEWES, supra note 15, at 20. See U.C.C. §§ 2-319, 2-320, 2-509, 2-520; 1980 Sales
Convention arts. 66-70. See generally P. ATriAH, THE SALES OF GOODS (1975); Takinawa,
Risk of Loss in Japanese Sales Transactions, 42 WASH. L. RFv. 463 (1967).
33 W. BEWES, supra note 15, at 20.
34 Id. at 22; See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (business records exception to hearsay rule).
35 Jones, supra note 19, at 450-51.
36 See Jones, supra note 19, at 445-51.
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tainty and variability in commercial law rules."7 The courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction eventually assumed the functions of the commer-
cial courts. Concomitantly, perhaps inevitably, commercial
litigation became protracted and expensive. Moreover, a previously
transnational law merchant became embedded in the myopic prism
of national adjudicatory sovereignty. Obviously, neither develop-
ment fostered the interests of the international community of
merchants.
C. Assessing the Historical Evolution
The necessity of commercial activity in conjunction with the feu-
dal circumstances of political decentralization allowed for the crea-
tion of a functional, albeit makeshift, process of commercial self-
regulation. The emergence of nation-states on the world stage and
the ensuing competition to maintain and enhance national identi-
ties inexorably led to the assertion of national authority upon com-
mercial dispute resolution, fragmenting uniformity as to both pro-
cedure and substance. Late twentieth century technological
sophistication and global interdependence demand anew a disloca-
tion of commercial regulation from national sources - a renewal of
the former emphasis upon the necessity and specialty of transna-
tional commercial relations. The development of institutional cen-
ters for international commerce attests to this emerging need.
37 Lord Mansfield's approach (Lord Mansfield became Lord Chief Justice in 1756) to
commercial litigation somewhat mitigated the consequences of this trend. Born and edu-
cated in Scotland, a mixed civil and common law jurisdiction, Mansfield derived many of
the principles of mercantile law from writings of foreign jurists and the general customs of
European merchants. For example, in his celebrated opinion in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 882,
889, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 619 (1759), Lord Mansfield resolved an issue of freight due for goods
lost at sea by referring to the Roman Pandects, the Consolato del Mare, Laws of Wisberry
and Oleron, and the French Ordonnances. This indicates not only that his approach was
international in scope, but also that he sought to discover the uniform principle underlying
a mercantile usage through a comparative assessment of its function in different legal sys-
tems. See generally Scrutton, supra note 15, at 7.
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II. THE FORMULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW
THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION
Institutional arbitration has emerged as a vehicle through which
parties may readily address disputes of a commercial nature, and it
has served to consolidate the status of arbitration as the remedy of
choice in the international arena:38
The primary significance of institutional arbitration, however,
lies in its expression of the non-national recognition of arbi-
tration, a recognition that it advances in the direction of a
full internationalization of the arbitral process. Centers of in-
stitutional arbitration . .. represent an increasingly "ana-
tional" means of implementing the arbitral remedy. 9
A. Non-National Nature of Arbitration as Reflected in ICC
Proceedings
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is a private or-
ganization; it receives no government subsidies and is independent
of government supervision. Accordingly, it need not conform to the
requirements of national legal systems and the other imperatives
that influence national court determinations. In addition, the ICC
Rules of Arbitration empower ICC tribunals to take commercial
customs into account even when a substantive national law governs
the resolution of the dispute:
The parties shall be free to determine the law to be applied
by the arbitrator to the merits of the dispute. In the absence
of any indication by the parties as to the applicable law, the
arbitrator shall apply the law designated as the proper law by
the rule of conflict which he deems appropriate ....
In all cases the arbitrator shall take account of the provi-
sions of the contract and the relevant trade usages.4
0
Carbonneau supra note 2, at 92.
39 Id. at 93.
40 ICC Rules art. 13(3) & 13(5) (emphasis added).
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Further, ICC rules enable arbitrators to act as amiable com-
positeurs.1 As one arbitrator has stated:
In addition to the power to decide the dispute before him on
the basis of generally accepted legal principles, without being
fettered by the technicalities of a particular legal system, the
arbitrator sitting as the "amiable compositeur" is entitled to
disregard legal or contractual rights of a party when the insis-
tence on such rights amounts to an abuse thereof."2
ICC arbitrators see their independence from national legal con-
straints as indispensable to their role in international adjudication
and law-making. As one arbitrator stated in a 1974 award:
I myself do not see the need for referring to any particular
set of national law rules....
As arbitrator I am myself no representative or organ of any
state. My authority as arbitrator rests upon an agreement be-
tween the parties to the dispute and by my activities I do not,
as State judges or other State representatives do, engage the
responsibility of [a state].... Furthermore, the courts and
other authorities of [a state] can in no way interfere with my
activities as arbitrator, neither direct me to do anything
which I think I should not do nor to direct me to abstrain
[sic] from doing anything which I think I should do."3
This independence from national procedural and substantive re-
quirements has led to the emergence of an arbitral decisional law
which identifies and applies fundamental principles of interna-
tional commercial law. As Professor Sanders, sitting as arbitrator
in a recent dispute, stated, previous awards "create caselaw which
should be taken into account, because it draws conclusions from
economic reality and conforms to the needs of international com-
merce, to which rules specific to international arbitration, them-
4 Id. art. 13(4).
" Partial Award of June 14, 1979, Case No. 3267, reprinted in [1982] Y.B. COM. AaB.
96, 105.
4- Award of 1974, Case No. 2321, reprinted in [1976] Y.B. COM. ARB. 132, 134.
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selves successively elaborated[,] should respond." 44
B. Fundamental Principles of International Commercial Law
Identified By ICC Awards
Recent ICC awards reveal that international arbitrators mini-
mize national law considerations and invoke general principles of
international commercial law to resolve disputes. In a 1979 award,
for example, a tribunal decided a difficult choice-of-law problem by
giving preemptive effect to international commercial law:
45
Faced with the difficulty of choosing a national law the ap-
plication of which is sufficiently compelling, the Tribunal con-
sidered that it was appropriate, given the international nature
of the agreement, to leave aside any compelling reference to a
specific legislation ... and to apply the international lex
mercatoria.46
In another award involving a breach of contract, the parties had
failed to stipulate an applicable law. There, the Tribunal held
that "in making its determination on the issues involved . . . [it]
will apply the widely accepted general principles governing com-
44 Interim Award of September 23, 1982, Case No. 4131, reprinted in [1984] Y.B. CoM.
Aim. 131, 136.
45 Award of October 26, 1979, Case No. 3131, reprinted in [1984] Y.B. CoM. AnB. 109;
see also Award of June 14, 1979 (as previously cited in note 42).
4' Award of October 26, 1979, at 110 (as previously cited in note 45); see also Award
made in Case No. 2103 (1972) (claim for penalty based on non-performance was contrary
"to the customs and practices generally observed in commercial matters and particularly in
international trade relations"); Award of June 14, 1979, Case No. 3267, at 98 (as previously
cited in note 42), in which the arbitrator noted "the silence of both parties on [the] question
of governing law [is] an admission from both parties that a predetermination of a given
applicable law was not necessary to enable the Arbitral Tribunal to decide upon any of the
issues presented to it." Thus, the Tribunal decided to "apply... widely accepted general
principlets] governing commercial international law with no specific reference to a particular
system of law." Id.
47 Partial Award of June 14, 1979, at 96 (as previously cited in note 42). The number of
published arbitral awards is doubtless far fewer than the number of decisions handed down
in the English and American common law systems. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to posit
that a rule, in order to be a "common law rule," need not be recognized in hundreds of cases
over hundreds of years. Rather, recognition of the same rule by different arbitrators may
well constitute proof that the arbitral process, like the fair courts of Medieval Europe, is
capable of producing substantive doctrines of commercial law.
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mercial international law with no specific reference to a particular
system of law."48
As did the medieval law merchant, ICC arbitral decisional law
recognizes such fundamental concepts of commerce as the good
faith obligation in commercial dealings.49 In a 1979 award involving
the breach of an agency agreement, the Tribunal stated:
In accordance with the principle of good faith which inspired
the international lex mercatoria, the Tribunal sought to de-
termine whether ... the breach of the agency was attributa-
ble to the conduct of one of the parties and whether it had
caused damage to the other which would thus be without jus-
tification and which equity would hence require to be
48 Id. at 98; see also Award of September 23, 1982, Case No. 4131, reprinted in [19841
Y.B. CoM. ARB. 131.
41 See, e.g., Award of October 26, 1979 at 110 (as previously cited in note 45). In con-
trast to the Vienna Convention's minimal emphasis on the principle of good faith are those
advanced national legal systems that generally require contractants to observe strict rules of
good faith and fair dealing. In the United States, for example, the Uniform Commercial
Code, which forty-nine American states have adopted, provides: "Every contract or duty
... imposes a duty of good faith in its performance or enforcement." Uniform Commercial
Code § 1-203. See also Restatement (Second) Contracts § 205 (1981) ("every contract im-
poses upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its en-
forcement"). See generally, Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reason-
ableness Under the U.C.C., 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666 (1963); Summers, Good Faith in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the U.C.C., 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968); GILMORE,
The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954). The Code's
general definition of good faith is "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction." With
regard to transactions between merchants, however, good faith additionally entails "the ob-
servance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
Louisiana, the only American state that has not adopted the U.C.C. sales articles, also
imposes an obligation on contractants to act in good faith. Article 1901 of the Louisiana
Civil Code provides that agreements "must be performed in good faith." The Civil Code
adopts the U.C.C.'s definition of good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."
European civil codes generally impose a requirement of good faith in commercial dealings.
Article 1134 of the French Civil Code contains the same language as the Louisiana Code.
Article 2426 of the German Civil Code provides: "The debtor is bound to effect performance
according to the requirements of good faith, giving consideration to common usage."
The European Economic Community also recognizes the obligation of good faith. See,
e.g., Flamm v. Comm. of the European Communities [1982] E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 2371;
Adam v. Comm. of the European Countries [1982] E. CoMM. CT. J. REP. 2431, 2436; Nun-
gesser v. Comm. of the European Communities [1982] E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 2015. See gener-
ally Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith and Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 H~Av. L. REv. 401 (1964).
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remedied.5'
The Tribunal concluded that the conduct of the defendant "was
scarcely compatible with the maintaining of good commercial rela-
tions" and therefore awarded unpaid commissions and damages to
the claimant.51 Also, ICC awards recognize, as did medieval fair
courts, that vital public policy matters are as essential to "good
commercial relations" as are good faith and fairness. The dictates
of public policy impinge upon the legality of contracts, mandating
certain limitations upon contractual freedom:
In general all agreements contrary to mandatory provisions of
law or public policy, to morality and bonos mores are null and
void .... This principle is recognized in all countries and in
all legal systems. It is an element of generally accepted con-
tract law in the international field.
2
The concept of the binding force of contracts is also an instru-
mental part of the ICC arbitral decisional law. The principle of
pacta sunt servanda is generally acknowledged in international
law. 5 The application of the principle has led to frequent claims of
force majeure or commercial frustration as a defense to the inabil-
ity to perform the contract. Recognizing the need for stability and
predictability in transnational commercial dealings, ICC arbitra-
tors have taken a restrictive view of the force majeure defense.
54
Regardless of some liberalizing national law variations on the doc-
trine, it can have but one central meaning and role for interna-
tional contracts litigation:
The principle [of force majeure] is universally considered
as being of strict and narrow interpretation, as a dangerous
50 Award of Oct. 26, 1979, at 111 (as previously cited in note 45); see also supra note
49.
" Id. at 111.
52 Award of 1982, Case No. 2930, reprinted in [1984] Y.B. COM. Ann. 105, 107.
53 See Carbonneau, supra note 11, at 593.
See also Award of May 30, 1979, Case Nos. 3099, 3100, reprinted in [1982] Y.B. CoM.
ARB. 87. In effect, ICC arbitral awards, which rarely uphold force majeure claims, have es-
tablished that three elements must be satisfied in order for force majeure to be applicable.
These elements, which are similar to those found in national laws, are externality, una-
voidability, and unforeseeability. Id. at 90.
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exception to the principle of sanctity to contracts. Whatever
opinion or interpretation lawyers of different countries may
have about the "concept" for changed circumstances as an ex-
cuse for non-performance, they will doubtless agree on the
necessity to limit the application of the so-called "doctrine
[of force majeure]" . . . to cases where compelling reasons
justify it.55
III. USING FIXED LEGISLATIVE RULES TO ESTABLISH
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") was formed in 1966. UNCITRAL's express goal is
the "promotion of the progressive harmonization and unification of
the law of international trade. '"5 The Commission's most recent
and notable attempt to achieve this goal has been the completion
of the United Nation's Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (The Vienna Convention), signed at Vienna in
1980. 57
The Vienna Convention, which purports to be a comprehensive
code similar to Article 2 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code,5s
will enter into force when ten nations ratify it;59 to date, six have
done so.60 The United States Senate has recently concluded hear-
ings on the ratification of the Convention6 ' and it is predicted that
"' Award made in Case No. 1512 (1971), reprinted in [1976] Y.B. COM. ARB. 129. See
Award made in Case No. 2142 (as previously cited in note 43). See also Award made in Case
No. 2478 (1974), reprinted in [1978] Y.B. CoM. ARB. 222.
" [1968-197011 Y.B. INT'L TRADE L. COMM'N 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/SER. A/1970.
'7 See Vienna Convention, supra note 12.
11 See supra note 13.
" Vienna Convention, supra note 12, at art. 99.
60 See Proposed United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods: Hearing on Treaty Doc. 98-9 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
98th Cong., 1st Session VI (1983) at 31. The Convention has been ratified by Argentina,
Egypt, France, Hungary, Lesotho and Syria. Id.
6 See Senate Hearings, supra note 13. Between 1981 and 1983, the State Department
published three notices to the public that meetings were to be held to discuss the Conven-
tion. See 48 Fed. Reg. 31762 (July 11, 1983); id. at 13541 (March 31, 1983); 46 Fed. Reg.
19134 (March 27, 1981). The State Department then recommended ratification to the Presi-
dent who transmitted the Convention to the Senate. 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1290
(Sept. 21, 1983) ("[Olur traders and their counsel find it difficult to evaluate and answer
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Senate ratification will encourage other nations to follow suit.2
The Vienna Convention has received significant support63 from
scholars, 4 business interests,6 5 and national and international legal
organizations. 6 Such support is not wholly unwarranted. First, as a
detailed commercial code, the Convention has at least the appear-
ance of comprehensiveness, giving some predictability as to the
consequences of commercial conduct. Second, since the Vienna
Convention is available in several languages, it is readily accessible
to contracting parties of different nationalities. A close examina-
tion of the Convention, however, reveals that it is substantially de-
ficient as a vehicle for establishing international commercial law; it
neither unifies the international law of sales nor provides for
greater transactional predictability.
claims based on one or another of the many unfamiliar foreign legal systems. The Conven-
tion's uniform rules offer effective answers to these problems.")
62 Senate Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Peter H. Pfund) ("[B]y setting an ex-
ample as the major trading country in the world, we will encourage many other countries to
become parties to the convention." Id. at 12).
" The Senate expects support and justification for all private international law conven-
tions to come from "primarily the private sector, rather than the U.S. Government," since
"the private sector can best explain why and how the conventions will provide tangible and
needed benefits to the private sector." Summary Minutes of the Secretary of State's Advi-
sory Committee on Private International Law, 38th Mtg. Prepared by George Taft (May 3,
1985) (received from E. Allan Farnsworth of the Association of American Law Schools,
Washington, D.C.).
See, e.g., J. HONNOLD, supra note 29.
"5 Business organizations urging Senate ratification include the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Foreign
Trade Council, the United States Council for International Business, and Business Interna-
tional. Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at 31. The German Federation of Industry, however,
is opposed to the Convention. Id. at 44.
" Id. The American Bar Association, the International Law Committee of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, and the International Chamber of Commerce have
all supported the Vienna Convention. Id. at 31. The British Law Society, however, is op-
posed to the Vienna Convention. Id. at 43-44. The Society points out that, although Great
Britain ratified the 1964 Hague Convention on international sales in 1967, there are virtu-
ally no British decisions that apply the Convention. Id. at 43. As a result, the Society con-
cluded that there was no reason to believe that the Vienna Convention would be applied by
British courts more frequently than the 1964 Hague Convention. Id.
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A. The Theory of Law-Making Underlying the Convention and
Its Ramifications
According to the approach of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the elaboration of an in-
ternationally-applicable law is dependent upon the harmonization
of national laws-"as the process by which conflicting rules of two
or more systems of national laws applicable to the same interna-
tional legal transaction is [sic] replaced by a single rule. '87 Under
the Vienna Convention, then, the elaboration of an international
law of sales resides in the reconciliation of existing national legal
principles - the elimination of conflicts and inconsistencies among
national commercial laws. A uniform corpus of controlling interna-
tional commercial law must be predicated upon agreement among
national legislatures rather than the actual practices of the inter-
national commercial community."8 It is a matter of politics and of
parochial conflicts resolution rather than a vision of a transcending
legal order specifically established to promote effective commercial
relations.
The proposal submitted by the French Delegation during the
drafting of the Convention reveals that the UNCITRAL theory of
international law-making is premised upon a servile acquiescence
to national sovereignty and a national self-interest that is not nec-
essarily in harmony with the interests of commerce. According to
the French proposal, international legislation can only be legiti-
67 Unification of the Law of International Trade: Note by the Secretariat, 20 U.N.
GAOR (Agenda Item 92) U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.172 (1965), reprinted in [1968-70] 1 Y.B. INT'L
TRADE L. COMM'N 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970.
18 Id. at 21 ("There can be no conflict of laws where a common solution is accepted by
all municipal laws."). The theory that a universally adopted text eliminates conflicts of law
was forcefully put forth by the Chinese representative, who observed:
[Sihould the various countries succeed in enacting uniform rules of substantive
law, the rules of private international law would no longer be relevant since those
rules presupposed that municipal laws would remain intact and merely sought to
mitigate the disadvantages arising from them. . . . [To paraphrase Beckett,]
[p]rivate international law, was in a sense the antithesis of the universal unifica-
tion of law. Its raison d'&tre was the existence [of] different systems of law . ...
Id. As these references reveal, UNCITRAL gave virtually no consideration to the likelihood




mated by capricious and unfettered state authority. There are two
primary principles of international law-making:
The first is that the rules applicable to transactions in inter-
national trade should be established... by agreement among
states. The second is that in every case, States must be per-
mitted to decline to apply the rules thus agreed upon wher-
ever they . . . jeopardize their interest or wherever for any
reason-which they cannot be called upon to state-they con-
sider that they should not accept them. 9
The substance of the French proposal contravenes the most vital
historical attributes of the law merchant, erroneously reducing the
elaboration of commercial law to a matter of politics and diplo-
macy. Most of the law merchant, in fact, was and continues to be
created by merchants and merchant courts in response to the eco-
nomic realities of commerce. Even when national courts assumed
adjudicatory power over commercial disputes, judges looked not
only to the local law for guidance, but also (in many cases) to for-
eign law and general commercial practice.70 Moreover, the alleged
prerogative of national sovereigns to modify or disregard the provi-
sions of an international convention at will eliminates the logical
coherence, uniformity, and predictability necessary for a fully
functional commercial law.
Given this reverence for national law, the objective of the draft-
ers of the Convention was to devise provisions that would accom-
modate conflicting national rules and traditions. The drafting ses-
sions reveal that a substantial amount of compromise was
necessary to arrive at a principled statement. Often, a rule from a
given legal system became the principal Convention rule and other
non-conforming national law rules were then integrated into the
text of the principal rule as exceptions. 1 When such inchoate ec-
"' The Establishment of a Union for Jus Commerce, Proposal of the French Delegation,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/60/1971, reprinted in [1971] YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 139, U.N. Doc. AL
CN.9/SER.A/1971.
70 See, e.g., supra note 37.
71 See Eorsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J. Comp. L. 311, 323 (1979); Note, Unification and Certainty:
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 97
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lecticism proved unsuccessful, the drafters simply accepted an in-
termediary position between conflicting views as the controlling
rule. The political whim of the national representatives seems to
have overridden the commercial effectiveness of the provisions.
For example, under some legal systems, contracting parties have
a duty to act in good faith at every stage of their transaction, while
other systems apply a good faith requirement only to the perform-
ance of the contract. The conflicting positions on this issue gener-
ated significant controversy and debate over the type of good faith
provision that should be included in the Convention, ultimately
forcing a compromise on even this basic principle of commercial
law.7 2 A Hungarian delegate's description of the objections to a
comprehensive good faith provision illustrates that primary con-
cern centered upon municipal law considerations rather than
whether present international law already incorporates a wide good
faith obligation. The focus of such debates fortifies doubts as to
whether a mere blending of national laws can produce a statement
of law of truly international dimensions:
[Some argued] that "good faith" was required under domestic
law, and the same requirement should be extended to inter-
national trade. Such an extension by individual countries had
been opposed on the ground that this would give aliens
greater protection against nationals in domestic courts than
such nationals would receive from foreign courts.73
The difficulties that can be isolated with the good faith obliga-
tion, while glaring and fundamental, are not atypical of the Con-
vention's provisions. Similar difficulties are apparent in the provi-
HARv. L. REV. 1984, 1989 (1984).
72 Earlier draft conventions did not include a reference to good faith; see J. HONNOLD,
supra note 29, at 123. The drafters of the Convention first referred to good faith in a provi-
sion that stated: "In the course of the formation of the contract the parties must observe the
principles of fair dealing and act in good faith." Id. By 1978, however, a divergence of views
forced a compromise on this provision. The drafters decided that a "good faith" provision
should not impose a general obligation but "should be restricted to a principle for interpret-
ing the provisions of the Convention." Id. But see Dore and DeFranzo, A Comparison of the
Non-Substantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of
Goods and the Uniform Commercial Codes, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49 at 60-61.
" Eorsi, supra note 71, at 313-14.
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sions dealing with the procedure in cases of non-conformity
(articles 39, 40, 44); trade usages (article 9); excuse (article 79(1));
reduction-of-price remedy (article 50); and the question of suspen-
sion of performance in the event of one party's insolvency (articles
71 and 72). 4
Since UNCITRAL is a political organization whose members
represent national governments, it is not surprising that the draft-
ing sessions often became political debates estranged from the di-
rect interests of commerce.7 5 Controversies ranged from national
pride in a particular legal rule 6 to squabbles involving matters
wholly irrelevant to the Convention." In fact, the variegated opin-
ions held by the delegates and the intensity with which those opin-
ions were expressed became a significant obstacle to completion of
the Convention.
Many Convention provisions purport to be unanimous adop-
tions; however, in reality, they reflect a loose consensus rather than
unanimity. As has been recognized:
" Note, supra note 71, at 1989-95. This is not to say that there was wide dissension on
the contents of all Convention provisions. The provisions relating to a duty to give notice
(articles 19, 21, 26) and those regarding transfer of risk (art. 67) do reflect a deeper consen-
sus among the drafters. See Vienna Convention, supra note 12, Summary Records of the
Meeting of the First Committee, (11th meeting) at 290-92, (13th meeting) at 304-05, (28th
meeting) at 388, (36th meeting) at 425-26, (37th meeting) at 430.
75 See generally, Farnsworth, Developing International Trade Law, 9 CAL. W. INTL L.J.
461, 465-67 (1979) discussing the way in which UNCITRAL made such matters as the Stat-
ute of Frauds and trade usages "just a few of the exciting political issues that we have faced
over the last decade." Id. at 467.
7' "Most Americans believe that the Uniform Commercial Code . . . is the most ad-
vanced commercial law. Most foreigners consider their own commercial law entirely satisfac-
tory if not the best." Lawyers' Comm. on the Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Memorandum: In the Threshold of an International Law of Sales 1 (Sept. 23,
1983), quoted in Note, supra note 71, at 1991 n.47.
77 For example, during the drafting of the convention on the prescriptive period appli-
cable to international sales, the Soviet Union objected to the appointment of a Chilean dele-
gate as the vice-president of one of the conferences on the ground that he was "a represen-
tative of the Chilean military junta, which had villainously murdered the lawful president of
Chile, Salvadore Allende, had overthrown the... government and was spreading bloody
terror ... throughout the country." Official Record of the United Nations Conference of
Prescription (Limitation) in the International Sale of Goods at 112, (3d plen. mtg.) U.N.
Doc. A/CN.63/SER.3/1974. The United States objected to such "baseless polemics." Id. at
113.
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Effective forward motion depends on the skill of the Chair-
man. When he senses the debate has produced the basis for
consensus, he will invite the group to accept that result.
When differences persist, he may appoint a small working
party reflecting the diverse points of view. . . .Often this
small working party .. .will produce a clean-cut decision;
sometimes it can find agreement only through .. .a hybrid
. ..mating of diverse approaches. By such processes it is pos-
sible for the Chairman to announce. . . that a consensus has
been reached."'
Even if objections to a proposed provision persisted, it could be
enacted with the objecting delegation merely noting its reserva-
tions on the record. 9 Some scholars were extremely critical of this
and other procedures. According to Professor Farnsworth, former
United States Delegate to UNCITRAL:
The Chairman will face a few people down. If nobody agrees
with the speaker, certain reservations are entered in the na-
ture of footnotes and the Commission gets along with its busi-
ness. Failing that, progress is made by talking each other to
death and by being extremely persistent. . . until, by a pro-
cess of attrition, someone gives in.80
The ineffectual results of patchwork compromise are apparent in
some of the Convention's central provisions. The article on good
faith again serves as a particularly telling illustration. Article 7
provides: "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be
had to. . .the observance of good faith in international trade." '8 1
The manifest content of the article restricts the scope of the good
faith obligation to the interpretation of the Convention without
specifically imposing such an obligation upon the contracting par-
ties. Article 7 represents an awkward compromise between dele-
gates who suggested that parties must act in good faith at every
stage of contracting and other delegates who contended that refer-
" Honnold, The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission
and Methods, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 201, 210-11 (1979).
79 Id. at 211.
Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 467.
8' Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 7(1).
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ences to such wide-ranging concepts as "good faith" and "fair deal-
ing" would lead to uncertainty in transactions.
Accordingly, the inconsonant result is reached that "the Conven-
tion rejects 'good faith' as a general requirement and uses 'good
faith' solely as a principle for interpreting [its] provisions. 8 2 This
leaves the determination of the status of the good faith obligation
under international commercial law to national court adjudication
- courts which, given the subtlety of the Convention's distinction,
are likely to employ the good faith standard that prevails in their
national law, thereby rendering the provisions of the Convention
ineffective as an aid to international commercial adjudication.
B. Ambiguous Provisions And Problems Of Interpretation
UNCITRAL's codification process, seeking to eliminate uncer-
tainty in the confection of transactions and in the resolution of
potential disputes, proceeded on the assumption that if "rules are
unified the outcome of disputes will be harmonized."8 3 As the Arti-
cle 7 good faith provision illustrates, many of the Convention's ma-
jor provisions are ambiguous, thereby necessitating some form of
judicial construction. The text of the Convention contains little in
the way of interpretive rules; national courts, then, are more likely
to reach different determinations even when addressing a similar
fact pattern. 4 In short, "a unified statement of rules does not
guarantee, nor even inevitably advance, a unified approach to sub-
stantive problems. If the rules are understood differently, differing
results will be reached.
'8 5
82 J. HONNOLD, supra note 29, at 123-24.
83 Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 45 Omio STATE L.J. 265, 285 (1984). Indeed, it is doubtful that
any text can produce certainty or determinancy of result. See Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theories, 94 YALE L. J. 1, 14 (1984) ("A legal theory or set of
legal rules is completely determinate if it is comprehensive, consistent, directive, and self-
revising. Any doctrine or set of rules that fails to satisfy any one of these requirements is
indeterminate because it does not fully constrain our choices.")
During hearings on the proposed ratification of the Vienna Convention, Senator Ma-
thias expressed concern over the possibility that case law will develop "on a piecemeal basis,
country by country." Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at 11.
85 Rosett, supra note 83, at 285.
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Article 7(2) purports to provide interpretive guidelines for courts
or arbitral tribunals ruling on questions that the Convention does
not expressly address. It requires that such questions be decided in
accordance with the general principles on which the Convention is
based."6 When such principles cannot be ascertained, the dispute is
to be resolved "in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of
the rules of private international law."'87 There are a number of
significant obstacles to the implementation of these guidelines.
The Convention nowhere identifies its basic founding principles.
The disagreement on such basic issues as the good faith obligation
indicates that no universally-accepted principles underlie it. In this
regard, the command of Article 7(2) is essentially meaningless. A
reference to generally-applicable principles of international com-
mercial law, rather than to those specifically underlying the Con-
vention, might have made Article 7(2) more meaningful by avoid-
ing the problem that the controlling principles might be
unidentifiable. Such ambiguities make it quite likely that choice-
of-law principles will be invoked frequently in order to localize a
governing law. The Convention, then, will have done little to lessen
the recourse to traditional, decentralized principles of private in-
ternational law to resolve transnational commercial disputes.
C. The Role of National Courts Under the Convention
Despite the experience with the 1958 New York Arbitration
Convention, it is unlikely, given the content of the Vienna Conven-
tion and its legislative history, that national courts will develop a
uniform approach toward the interpretation of its provisions. In
testimony before the U.S. Senate, the State Department sought to
assuage concerns that the Convention would increase rather than
lessen the substantive disharmony in international law, by assert-
ing that decisional law pertaining to the Convention will be moni-
tored by UNCITRAL and will be made widely available. 8 The
State Department also advanced the specious view that "[i]f cer-
88 Vienna Convention, supra note 12, at art. 7(2).
87 Id.
Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at 6.
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tain developments in case law in some countries should be unsatis-
factory from the point of view of U.S. traders, the individual trad-
ers are of course free in their sales contracts to provide for terms
that will apply and to which the Convention would yield." '89
Such individual deviations would themselves undermine the ef-
fort to achieve the benefits of uniformity. The necessity of allowing
for such deviations reveals that the effort to achieve authentic in-
ternational uniformity in substantive commercial law should be
predicated upon the proven realities of commercial practice rather
than the confounding language of diplomatic squabbling. More-
over, in the United States, for example, the Uniform Commercial
Code has caused significant interpretative difficulties, and sharp
splits of authority exist as to the meaning and application of sev-
eral of the Code's important provisions." It is likely that the provi-
sions of the Convention will generate at least as much debate, es-
pecially in an environment that does not have the homogeneity
and cohesiveness of a single national culture.
Despite the reputed judicial deference to statutory law in civil
law countries, civilian courts may also contribute to a non-uniform
interpretation of the Convention.9 The French Court of Cassation
has exercised broad discretion in construing provisions of the
French Civil Code. For example, the Court has interpreted a
purely transitional article to embody a far-reaching strict custodial
89 Id. at 11.
90 For example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which seeks only to unify
the law of one nation, the United States, has given rise to numerous conflicting interpreta-
tions of several of its important provisions. Compare Raybond Electronics v. Glen-Mar Door
Manufacturing Co., 22 Ariz. App. 409, 528 P.3d 160 (1974) (procedural unconscionability)
with Allen v. Michigan Bell Telephone Company, 18 Mich. App. 634, 171 N.W.2d 689 (1969)
(substantive unconscionability). See generally Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975); Note, Contractual Interactions
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 89 YALE L. J. 1396, 1404-07 (1980) (discussing U.C.C. §
2-207).
91 See Perrot, The Judge: The Extent and Limit of His Role in Civil Matters, 50 TUL.
L. REv. 495 (1976) ("The interpretation of the legal rule ... opens to the civil [law] judge
vast horizons, the potential of which he discovers daily.") Id. at 498. See generally F. GENY,
MtTHODE D'INTERPRETATION Er SOURCES EN DRorr PRivb PosiTF (La. State L. Inst. 2d ed.
trans. 1963); Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TuL. L. REv. 459 (1976). See
also Dixon, Judicial Method in Interpretation of Law in Louisiana, 42 LA. L. REv. 1661,
1662 (1982).
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liability doctrine, 2 and, on occasion, it has developed legal princi-
ples and doctrines in direct conflict with the express language of
the Code.9" Unless such courts develop a special policy for interna-
tional law matters, there is no reason to believe that greater defer-
ence will be exhibited to the Vienna Convention than to their own
civil codes.
The Convention does encourage courts to look to previous deci-
sions for guidance when interpreting the Convention. However, it
is doubtful that courts will do so. As a practical matter, decisions
from foreign countries are often difficult to obtain and are rarely
translated into other languages. Even if UNCITRAL establishes an
international reporter system, it is highly uncertain whether courts
in civil law jurisdictions, which have no formal doctrine of stare
decisis, will consider themselves obligated to follow prior interpre-
tations from foreign jurisdictions. It appears, therefore, that over
time national courts will develop their own decisional law under
the Convention, and eventually the need for private international
law and its conflicts principles will re-emerge.
D. Other Issues Inhibiting U.S. Adoption of the Convention
U.S. Senate ratification of the Convention will have a number of
effects. First, by operation of the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, the Convention will become the "supreme law
of the land," preempting all federal and state commercial law that
now applies to transactions within the scope of the Convention. 4
In light of the substantive problems with the Convention, it is
doubtful that the Senate would allow it to have such broad pre-
emptive effect, making it necessary to give a qualified ratification.
Second, Senate ratification would immunize the Convention's pro-
91 Tunc, supra note 91, at 466 (describing interpretation of Code Civil Frangais art.
1384). "The first paragraph of Article 1384 ... is devoid of all meaning and is a purely
stylistic effort at a smooth transition. Our courts, however, have used [it] . . . to build a
general liability for damage caused by things." Id.
11 Id. at 465 (describing interpretation of Code Civil Frangais art. 1165). "[Iun sheer
disregard of a clear [C]ode article . . . [courts] have allowed stipulation[s] on behalf of a
third party and established rules which govern it." Id.




visions indefinitely from modification. Under the Supremacy
Clause, neither Congress nor the States could alter the Convention.
As Senator Mathias stated: "I suppose what my concern is, that we
would get locked into a situation that would require the unani-
mous consent of all the parties to the Convention to any alteration
of it." 95
Such concerns are well-founded. Although the Convention re-
quires unanimous consent for modifications or amendments, UN-
CITRAL has not established a schedule of meetings to consider
modifications; it may be exceedingly difficult to reassemble all of
the UNCITRAL delegates and arrive at agreement on modifica-
tions. As flaws in the Convention will not be easily remedied, par-
ties will be forced to contract out of the Convention's scope, fur-
ther weakening its authority.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The evolution and current status of national economies within
the international commercial context demand the elaboration of a
revitalized law merchant that will accommodate the transnational
dimensions of late twentieth-century commerce. The creation of
such a corpus of commercial law will require a consensus among
and endorsement from national legal systems in the form of a pol-
icy designed specifically to respond to private international law
matters on their own terms. The Vienna Convention, rooted in na-
tional law considerations seeking to preserve the prerogatives of
sovereignty in a competitive political environment, is an inappro-
priate instrument by which to accomplish the task. The text of the
Convention is riddled with instances of parochial political compro-
mise and accompanying substantive ambiguities that only can
undo the fabric of international commerce, which continues to be
estranged from the realm of politics and diplomacy.
The critical deficiency of the UNCITRAL approach to the unifi-
cation of international commercial law inheres in UNCITRAL's or-
ganization and institutional mission. At some level, and unavoid-
95 Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at 11 (remark made during testimony of Frank A.
Orban III).
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ably so, questions pertaining to international trade are political in
character. They implicate and reflect all of the major elements of
divisiveness in the world community: the dichotomy between civil
and common law juridical methodologies; the competition between
East-West ideological visions; and the North-South political, cul-
tural, and economic rift. While these political consequences of
world trade need to be recognized and addressed through appro-
priate mechanisms, the uneasy and qualified reconciliation of na-
tional views is an unfortunate and inadequate basis upon which to
establish a foundation for private international commercial inter-
course. The quest for unification is envisaged exclusively in a self-
defining political universe that is tolerant only of political consid-
erations. World commerce is myopically seen as a matter of na-
tional legal tradition, economic self-interest, and ideology. The au-
tonomy of commerce and the self-evident realities of its operation
are too often given only a modicum of attention. More signifi-
cantly, the elaboration of an international commercial law is di-
vorced nearly entirely from a consideration of its implementation
through a process-other than through the infelicitous means of
national court adjudication.
At this juncture, there is no persuasive reason to depart from the
operation of the process that has worked so well, in its own make-
shift way, to secure and encourage international commercial activ-
ity. Arbitral adjudication has created a universally-acknowledged
mechanism for private international dispute resolution. There are
strong indications that the process is now yielding the basic tenets
of a common law of international contracts and applying these
principles effectively in an adjudicatory context without protests of
lawlessness. The applicable law is emerging; it appears to be com-
prehensive, predictable, equitable, and workable. With perhaps
some modifications that might help to sustain its growth in this
direction, such as having awards rendered by way of published de-
cisions with reasons, the process should be allowed to evolve and
bring its fruits to bear.
(Completed June 1986)
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